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Abstract
In the last decades, income inequality has been on the rise in the
U.S. The growing skill premium suggests the pivotal role of skill-
biased technological change (SBTC) in promoting the observed in-
crease in inequality levels. In this context, labor income tax struc-
tures have been central to the policy debate. I develop an overlap-
ping generations model to perform a welfare evaluation of Univer-
sal basic income (UBI) tax structures and verify how these interact
with SBTC. I find that an UBI system would have improved so-
cial welfare in 2010 when compared to the existing tax system and
determine that this result is primarily motivated by SBTC.
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1 Introduction
More and more, society is faced with the everyday reality of automation as it has become an
issue of outmost relevance. With many of the discussions regarding it being centered around its
political and ethical implications, one of the key subjects to these debates is the one of techno-
logical unemployment. The process of job destruction due to technological progress has been
mentioned since long ago. Keynes (1930) commented that new ways of economizing on labor
were increasingly being found faster than new uses for labor itself and even way before, Ricardo
(1821) had already discussed this issue voicing his worries for the class of laborers. In addition
to this, automation has also been linked to a process named skill-biased technological change
(SBTC)1. Through this process, the development of new technologies ends up favoring skilled
workers in detriment of non-skilled ones and generating a skill premium that has been on the
rise as seen in Figure 1. This increase happens at a time when the U.S. is also facing a problem
of rising income inequality.
Figure 1: Constant-dollar median weekly earnings of full-time wage and salary workers, 25 years and
over. Skilled workers correspond to those with a Bachelor’s degree or higher. Non-skilled ones are the
others. This skill premium is calculated as the ratio between the two without accounting for composition
changes related to gender, sex, etc. Data for the U.S. from: BLS Current Population Survey
This possible relationship between skill-biased technological change and income inequality
has been well established and documented in the literature (eg: Mincer (1991), Autor et al.
(1998), Katz et al. (1999)). Furthermore, the negative impact of inequality on social welfare is
also extensively well reported with it being associated with poorer growth, higher poverty, so-
cial and political instability and other negative social and economic factors. Dabla-Norris et al.
(2015) IMF report has a comprehensive summary of the negative socioeconomic consequences
1The issue of skill-biased technological change is central to this article and therefore, will be better analyzed
and explained in the subsequent sections.
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of income inequality.
On the other side of the coin, technological change is also largely considered a main propo-
nent of economic growth and consequently, its overall welfare impact can be rather ambiguous
as concluded by Eden and Gaggl (2018). All in all, conflicting views on the short and long-run
consequences of technological development have been emerging for a long time but due to the
higher speed of technological progress experienced recently, this topic has become of much higher
importance in recent years.
In the middle of this context, a particular type of tax structure has gained notoriety, that
is universal basic income (UBI). UBI consists of a cash transfer from a country’s government
to all its citizens and it can be either conditional on some requirements or totally uncondi-
tional. Its proponents focus their arguments on the fact that it helps low-wage workers by
giving them the necessary flexibility to avoid the unemployment trap and make optimal career
and life choices, therefore improving literacy and productivity, decreasing crime and stabilizing
the economy during economic downturns. Contrarily, its opponents argue that it discourages
work and productivity and puts a huge burden on the government budget. Through contrasting
lenses of analysis, different articles have weighed these pros and cons (eg: Van Parijs (2004),
Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017)). Furthermore, some pilot programs and experiments have
already been tested in countries like Brazil, Canada, Finland, Kenya and even the U.S., with
conflicting results being documented, mostly likely due to the difficulty of a full large-scale trial
of such system.2
This research proposes to compute the optimal level of an UBI system financed with a
flat labor tax rate for an economy resembling that of the U.S. in 1980 and 2010. Through this
analysis, the article intends to evaluate whether an unconditional basic income could encompass
a social welfare improvement over past tax systems, and then, verify whether this pertains to
SBTC or not. This will be done by developing an overlapping generations model, similar to that
of Brinca et al. (2016), featuring agent heterogeneity, uninsurable idiosyncratic earnings risk
and incomplete markets. Additionally, the model will divide labor into skilled and non-skilled
categories, a framework akin to that of Krusell et al. (2000), Autor et al. (2003) and Ferrreira
(2019). Since the model sets a steady-state, full-employment is assumed and consequently, the
issue of job destruction will not be addressed. Instead, the focus will be on the issue of rising
inequality and wage dispersion in the context of SBTC.
It is found that an UBI system would have improved U.S.’s social welfare in comparison to
2010’s tax-transfer system and that the optimal level of UBI would actually consist of a lump-
sum transfer of around 8% of GDP/Capita and a flat income tax rate of 28.5%. Moreover, it
2Examples of these experiments in the U.S. include the the Negative Income Tax (NIT) experiments in the
60s and 70s or the Permanent Fund Dividend (PFD) paid to Alaska residents.
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was also determined that this result is mainly driven by the process of skill-biased technological
change. The rationale behind these conclusions is that, in the modeling choice used, technology
is factor-augmenting, therefore creating a positive shock to the permanent component of skilled
workers productivity. This raises the skill premium and consequently inequality, therefore mo-
tivating the case for more redistribution. The reasoning presented is very similar to the one of
Heathcote et al. (2017).
The article will be organized as follows: Section 2 will cite a review of the relevant literature
regarding the current article, Section 3 presents the devised theoretical model and Section 4 the
calibration procedure, Section 5 details the fiscal experiment, Section 6 exhibits the quantitative
results and Section 7 will conclude.
2 Related Literature
This paper develops on the existing literature on skill-biased technological change which builds
on the notion that low-skill jobs tend to be more easily automated as they are substitutable
by capital, in contrast to high-skill ones which are generally more complementary to capital.
Taking that into consideration, as the price of investment decreases due to new and cheaper tech-
nology being developed, there will consequently be decreased demand for lower-skilled workers
associated with higher demand for high-skilled ones. This is then, largely considered one of the
main factors behind increasing skill wage premiums which in turn, are responsible for increasing
income inequality (eg: Krusell et al. (2000), Autor et al. (2003)). Brinca et al. (2019a) find that
both SBTC and decreases in tax progressivity since the 80’s account for more than 30% of the
observed increase in income inequality. Figure 2 shows the evolution of income inequality and
the price of investment for the U.S. since 1980. It can be promptly seen that the relative price
of investment declined from 1 in 1980 to 0.285 in 2018, strongly demonstrating the degree of
technological transformation seen in the last decades.3
To further deepen this idea, UK’s Office for National Statistics provides some data on
the probability of automation occurring to certain professions. From this list, the least probable
workers to face automation are medical practitioners with a probability of 18.1%, while the most
probable are waiters with a probability of 72.8%. By analyzing the full data table, it is clear
that jobs that require no degree have, on average, a much higher probability of being automated
than the ones who require such degree.4
This article is also linked to literature on the decline of the labor share that demonstrates
the substitution of labor for capital in the production process. In relation to this, both Karabar-
3Through the author’s calculations, the relative price of investment was normalized to 1 in 1980 for simplicity
purposes.
4An excerpt of the full table can be found in Appendix D.
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Figure 2: Gini index (world bank estimate) and relative price of investment calculated as the ratio
between the CPI and the implicit price deflator on fixed investment on equipment - 1980 is normalized
to 1. Data for the U.S. from: The World Bank; BEA
bounis and Neiman (2013) and Eden and Gaggl (2018) conclude with the same result, that the
fall in investment price is responsible for around half of the decline in labor share.
Additionally, the present article also builds on the research on optimality of fiscal policy
measures. With respect to this, many different tax structures have been researched and sug-
gested with most focusing on taxation of labor and capital.5
Concerning optimal labor taxation, Heathcote et al. (2017) concludes that it would be
possible for welfare to be improved with a decrease in tax system progressivity. It follows,
nonetheless, by suggesting that the model has limiting forces and that optimal progressivity
varies with the level of inequality. On the other hand, Saez (2001) concludes by stating that
marginal tax rates ought to be raised between the middle and top of the income distribution,
a conclusion similar to that of Krueger et al. (2013) which, in a model with endogenous educa-
tion decisions, states that the labor income tax should be rather progressive. Further relevant
literature regarding this topic includes the work of Conesa and Krueger (2006) which concludes
that the optimal income tax system can consist of a flat tax rate with a considerable deduction.
Relatively to capital taxation, Chamley (1986) concludes that in the short-run, optimal
capital taxation might be positive but in the long-run it should be zero. In contrast Aiyagari
(1995) reasons that it should always be positive, including the long-run. In addition, Conesa
et al. (2009) conclude that the optimal consists of an heavy capital tax.
Another policy which has been largely suggested as a solution to inequality and has gained
considerable mediatic attention recently is the one of protectionism and rising trade barriers.
Krusell et al. (2000) conclude, however, that this is not adequate and add that to narrow in-
5Most of research on optimal taxation is built on the work of Ramsey (1927) and Mirrlees (1971).
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equality, the focus should be on improving training and education for non-skilled workers.
Relatively to the disparities found in the conclusions of optimal taxation papers, it can be
verified that one of the major reasons behind them regards the attribution of different causes
to income inequality. With regard to this, the present article will also contribute by studying
SBTC as one of these possible causes.
To end up with, this paper contributes to the research done on the role of universal basic
income as a redistributive policy. Most of this research has been empirical and focused on specific
national or regional applications of quasi-UBI programs. In this regard, Marinescu (2018) re-
views the possible impact of unconditional transfer implementation in developed countries, more
particularly the U.S. Based on the Alaska PFD, she concludes that unconditional transfers affect
little the labor supply but might improve children’s education. From Hanna and Olken (2018),
evidence from Peru and Indonesia suggests that targeted transfer methods dominate universal
transfer ones in terms of welfare gains and suggest this evidence might be relevant for developing
countries in general. In Iran, Salehi-Isfahani and Mostafavi-Dehzooei (2018) found that the cash
transfer program of 2011 entailed a positive impact in labor supply of women and self-employed
men and either a positive or non-significant impact in the labor supply of the overall population.
For Finland, Koistinen and Perkio¨ (2014) conclude that the implementation of basic income has
been shown to be of great difficulty as it has failed repeatedly.
Finally, in a more recent series of papers, Guerreiro et al. (2017) using a task-based frame-
work confirms the relationship between automation and income inequality and suggests changes
ought to be made to the existing U.S. tax system. This article follows by suggesting the imple-
mentation of an universal basic income system with lump-sum transfers financed by a tax on
robots. Additionally, and in a more similar fashion to the current paper, Lopez-Daneri (2016)
analyzes the effects of a negative income tax system implementation through a life-cycle model
calibrated to the U.S. and finds the negative income tax to be better in performance than a
simple flat tax on labor.
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3 Model
The model consists of an incomplete markets economy with overlapping generations of heteroge-
neous agents and partial uninsurable idiosyncratic risk that generates both income and wealth
distributions. The basic setup is that of Brinca et al. (2016) with a more detailed production
function as in the case of Ferrreira (2019).
To correctly model the SBTC process, households are divided into 2 different categories:
Non-skilled and Skilled. An important aspect of the model is that there is no endogenous ed-
ucation choice, instead the attribution of abilities is done randomly at birth. While skilled
households are born with certain abilities that allow them to perform tasks that are more com-
plementary to capital, non-skilled households, on the other hand, are born with abilities that
allow them to perform tasks that are substitutable by capital.
Demographics
In this model, the economy is populated by a set of J-1 overlapping generations. A house-
hold starts its labor decisions when it is 20 years old and retires at 65. From retirement onwards,
households face an age-dependent probability of dying π(j) and therefore a probability of sur-
viving ω(j) = 1− π(j). A period in the model is considered 1 year, thus, j, the household’s
age, varies between j = 0 (for age 20 households) and j = 80 (for age 100 households. It is also
considered that π(80) = 1 and equivalently ω(80) = 0, meaning households die for sure when
100 years old. One can also verify that, at any given time, the probability of being alive for a
j ≥ 45 household is given by Ωj =
∏i=j
i=45ω(i). By the law of large numbers, this also represents
the mass of retired agents of a given age {j}.
Besides age, households also differ across permanent ability level {a}, persistent idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks {u}, asset holdings {h} and a discount factor which takes on two
distinct values {β1,β2}, which are uniformly distributed across agents.
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Relatively to permanent ability level {a}, prior to joining the labor market, agents draw
from a uniform distribution with the threshold {tS}, such that group employment weights match
the data. Therefore, an agent is able to supply skilled labor if its draw is greater than tS and
vice-versa.
Working age agents have to maximize their utility by choosing how much to work {nt},
how much to consume {ct} and how much to save {kt+1}. Retired households only have the
consumption and saving decisions and also receive a retirement benefit {Ψt}.
There are no annuity markets, so that a fraction of households leave unintended bequests
which are redistributed in a lump-sum manner between the households that are currently alive,
6Asset holdings, discount factors and the idiosyncratic shock will later be explained.
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denoted by Γ. A bequest motive is included in this framework to make sure that the age dis-
tribution of wealth is empirically plausible such as in Brinca et al. (2019b) and Brinca et al.
(2019c).
Labor Income
Labor productivity depends on three distinct elements which determine the number of
efficiency units each household is endowed with in each period: age {j}, labor variety group
or permanent ability {a} and an idiosyncratic productivity shock {u} which follows an AR(1)
process such as:
uit = ρuuit−1 + εit, εit ∽N(0,σ
2
ε) (1)
Household i’s wage will then be given by:
wit(j,ai,uit) = w
s
t e
γ1j+γ2j
2+γ3j
3+ai+uit (2)
where γ1, γ2 and γ3 are calibrated directly from the data to capture the age profile of wages.
Households’ labor income depends on the wage per efficiency unit of labor wst , s ∈ S ≡ {NS,S},
where s is the labor variety supplied by the household.
Household Preferences
The utility of households,7 U(cit,nit), is increasing in consumption and decreasing in work
hours with nit ∈ (0,1], and is defined as:
U(cit,nit) =
c1−λit
1−λ
−χ
n1+ηit
1+ η
(3)
Retired households’ utility function loses the labor term but gains an extra one, as they gain
utility from the bequest they leave to living generations such that:
U(cit,nit) =
c1−λit
1−λ
+D(h
′
it) (4)
where:
D(h
′
it) = ϕ log(h
′
it) (5)
7Disutility not dependent on occupation type S or NS.
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Production Technology
For the production side of the economy, the modeling strategy used is very close to that
found in Krusell et al. (2000) and Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013).
In this economy there are two competitive final goods sectors, consumption and investment
goods, which are produced by transforming a single intermediate input using a linear produc-
tion technology. The single intermediate input used in both sectors is represented as {zct ,z
x
t }
respectively for consumption and investment sectors.
The transformation technologies used are:
(Consumption good)
Ct+Gt = z
c
t (6)
(Investment good)
Xt = z
x
t (7)
Given that the final goods are competitively produced, their prices equal the marginal
costs of production, such as:
(Consumption good)
pct = p
z
t = 1 (8)
(Investment good)
pxt = p
z
t = 1 (9)
A representative intermediate goods firm produces yt = z
c
t + z
x
t using a constant returns
to scale technology in capital and labor inputs such that yt = F (Kt;N
NS
t ;
NSt ) where Kt is capital, N
S
t is skilled labor and N
NS
t is non-skilled labor. The firm rents capital
at rate rt and each labor variety at w
s
t ,s ∈ {NS,S}.
Aggregate demand measured in terms of the consumption good is given by: Yt = Ct +
Gt+Xt. Factor prices {rt,w
s∈S
t } and the price of the intermediate good {p
z
t } are all taken as
given. Consequently, the firm maximizes profits by choosing the amount of capital and labor
inputs each period:
max{Kt,Ns∈St }
Π
z
t = p
z
t yt− rtKt−w
NS
t N
NS
t −w
S
t N
S
t
s.t. yt = z
c
t + z
x
t = Ct+Gt+Xt = Yt
(10)
This implies: zct = Ct+Gt, z
x
t =Xt and yt = F (.) = Yt
We assume that the production function of the intermediate good is constant elasticity of
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substitution (CES) and takes the following functional form:
F
(
Kt,N
NS
t ,N
S
t
)
=At
(
φ1
(
Zt
)σ−1
σ
+
(
1−φ1
)(
NNSt
)σ−1
σ
) σ
σ−1
Zt =
(
φ2
(
Kt
) ρ−1
ρ
+
(
1−φ2
)(
NSt
) ρ−1
ρ
) ρ
ρ−1
(11)
where At is total factor productivity, φ1 and φ2 are factor shares, ρ is the elasticity of substitution
between capital and skilled labor, and σ is the elasticity of substitution between the composite
of those factors and non-skilled labor.
Firm maximization implies that marginal products equal factor prices such that:
rt =
[
Aσ−1t Yt
]
φ1Z
σ−ρ
ρσ
t φ2
(
1
Kt
) 1
ρ
,
wSt =
[
Aσ−1t Yt
]
φ1Z
σ−ρ
ρσ
t (1−φ2)
(
1
NSt
) 1
ρ
,
wNSt = (1−φ1)
(
Aσ−1t Yt
NNSt
) 1
σ
(12)
The capital law of motion is:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt+Xt, (13)
where Xt is aggregate gross investment and δ is the depreciation rate.
Government
In the model, the government runs the social security system as well as the tax system.
The social security system runs a balanced budget. Revenues are collected from taxes on
employees at rate {τSS} and on the representative intermediate good firm at rate {τ˜SS}, which
are used to pay for the retirement benefits {Ψt}. Denoting social security revenues by R
SS
t , the
social security budget constraint is given by:
RSSt =Ψt
( ∑
j≥45
Ωj
)
(14)
Relatively to the general tax system, the government taxes consumption {τc}, capital income
{τk} and labor income {τl}. Consumption and capital are taxed at flat rates whereas labor
income tax follows a non-linear functional form as in Benabou (2002) and recently used in
Heathcote et al. (2017):
τl = 1− θ1y
−θ2 , (15)
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where {θ1} defines the level of the tax schedule and {θ2} defines its progressivity. {y} is pre-tax
labor income while {τl} is the average tax rate given a pre-tax income of y. All these revenues
are used to finance public consumption of goods {Gt}, lump-sum transfers to households {gt}
and interest payments on public debt {RtBt}. Denoting tax revenues by {Tt}, the government
budget constraint is defined as:
Tt−Gt−RtBt = gt
(
45+
∑
j≥45
Ωj
)
(16)
Asset Structure
Households hold two types of assets: capital {k} and government bonds {b}. The return
rate on the bond must satisfy:
1+ (r− δ)(1− τk) = 1+R(1− τk) (17)
which follows from non-arbitrage so that investing in capital yields the same return as investing
the same amount in bonds. The state variable for the consumer is:
h≡ [1+ (r− δ)(1− τk)]k+ [1+R(1− τk)]b (18)
Using (17), in equilibrium we can re-write the previous equation as:
h= [1+ (r− δ)(1− τk)](k+ b) (19)
where we define q ≡ 1/[1+ (r− δ)(1− τk)].
Household Problem
On any given period a household is defined by age j, asset position h, time discount factor
β ∈ {β1,β2}, permanent ability a, a persistent idiosyncratic productivity shock u and a time-
constant ability to supply a given labor variety s ∈ {NS,S}. A working-age household chooses
consumption c, work hours n and future asset holdings h′ to solve his optimization problem.8
The household budget constraint is given by:
c(1+ τc)+ k
′+ b′ = (1+ (r− δ)(1− τk))k+(1+R(1− τk))b+ Γ+ g+Y
N (20)
where Y N is the household’s labor income after social security and labor income taxes. Using
8Prime (’) is used to denote next period values of a variable.
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(18) and (19) we can rewrite the budget constraint as:
c(1+ τc)+ qh
′ = h+ Γ+ g+Y N (21)
The living household problem can then be formulated recursively as:
V (j,h,β,a,u) =max{c,n,h′}
[
U(c,n)+βEu′
[
V (j+1,h′,β,a,u′)
]]
s.t. :
c(1+ τc)+ qh
′ = h+ Γ+ g+Y N
Y N =
nw(j,a,u)
1+ τ˜SS
(
1− τSS − τl
(
nw(j,a,u)
1+ τ˜SS
))
n ∈ [0,1], h′ ≥−h, h0 = 0, c > 0
(22)
The problem of a retired household differs on three dimensions: age dependent probability
of dying π(j), the bequest motive D(h′), and labor income, which is replaced by retirement
benefits. Therefore, the retired household’s problem is defined as:
V (j,h,β) =max{c,h′}
[
U(c,n)+β(1−π(j))V (j+1,h′,β)+π(j)D(h′)
]
s.t. :
c(1+ τc)+ qh
′ = h+ Γ+ g+Ψ
h′ ≥−h, c > 0
(23)
Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Φ(j,h,β,a,u) is the measure of agents with corresponding characteristics (j,h,β,a,u). The
stationary recursive competitive equilibrium is defined by:
1. Taking factor prices and initial conditions as given, the value function V (j,h,β,a,u) and
the policy functions, c(j,h,β,a,u),h′(j,h,β,a,u) and n(j,h,β,a,u) solve the household’s
optimization problem.
2. Markets clear:
[1+ (r− δ)(1− τk)](B+K) =
∫
h+ ΓdΦ,
NNS =
∫
a>a∗
ndΦ
NS =
∫
a≤a∗
ndΦ
C +X +G= F (K,NNS ,NS) = Y.
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3. Equilibrium equations in (12) hold.
4. The government budget balances:
g
∫
dΦ+G+RB =
∫ (
τk
(
r− δ
)( h+ Γ
1+ (r− δ)(1− τk)
)
+ τcc+nτl
(
nw(a,u,j)
1+ τ˜SS
)
dΦ
5. The social security system balances:
∫
j≥45
ΨdΦ =
τ˜SS + τSS
1+ τ˜SS
(∫
j<45
nwdΦ
)
6. The assets of the deceased at the beginning of the period are uniformly distributed among
the living:
Γ
∫
ω(j)dΦ =
∫
(1−ω(j))hdΦ
4 Benchmark Economy Calibration
The model was calibrated to match moments of the economy of the U.S. in 1980, the benchmark
economy, using a method similar to that of Brinca et al. (2016). Some parameters can be cal-
ibrated outside of the model as they have direct empirical counterparts, these are described in
table 2. The remaining of parameters are endogenously calibrated using the Simulated Method
of Moments (SMM) approach.
Preferences
The value of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply varies greatly in the literature, η. In this cali-
bration it is set to 1, according to a variety of recent studies (e.g. Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)).
In addition, risk aversion was set to 1.1. The parameters ϕ, governing the utility of leaving
bequests, χ, governing the disutility of working an additional hour, and the discount factors
{β1,β2} are calibrated so that the model output matches empirical data moments. This part
will be discussed further below.
Labor and Wages
To estimate the life cycle profile of wages, data from the Panel of Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) is used and the following regression is ran:
ln(wi) = ln(w)+ γ1j+ γ2j
2 + γ3j
3 + εi, (24)
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Table 1: 1980 Calibration Summary
Description Parameter Value Source
Preferences
Inverse Frisch elasticity η 1.000 Trabandt and Uhlig (2011)
Risk aversion parameter λ 1.100 Literature
Labor and Wages
Parameter 1 age profile of wages γ1 0.265 Brinca et al. (2016)
Parameter 2 age profile of wages γ2 -0.005 Brinca et al. (2016)
Parameter 3 age profile of wages γ3 0.000 Brinca et al. (2016)
Persistence of idiosyncratic risk ρu 0.335 Brinca et al. (2016)
Technology
Depreciation rate δ 0.060 Brinca et al. (2016)
Share of the composite φ1 0.550 Eden and Gaggl (2018)
Share of capital φ2 0.805 Eden and Gaggl (2018)
EOS non-skilled/composite ρ 1.670 Authors’ calculations
EOS skilled/capital σ 0.670 Authors’ calculations
Total factor productivity A 1.000 Normalization
Government and Social Security
Consumption tax rate τc 0.054 Mendoza et al. (1994)
Capital income tax rate τk 0.469 Mendoza et al. (1994)
Tax scale parameter θ1 0.940 Implied by clearing condition
Tax progressivity parameter θ2 0.160 Ferriere and Navarro (2018)
Government debt to GDP B/Y 0.320 FRED
Military spending to GDP G/Y 0.053 World Bank
SS tax employees τss 0.061 Social Security Bulletin, July 1981
SS tax employers τ˜ss 0.061 Social Security Bulletin, July 1981
where j is the age of individual i. The persistence of idiosyncratic risk is set to 0.335 in light of
Brinca et al. (2016). The variance of idiosyncratic risk, σǫ is calibrated through SMM to match
the variance of ln(wi) to that of the data. The parameter for the variance of ability, σa is also
calibrated through SMM so that the model’s income Gini also matches the corresponding data
moment.
Technology
In relation to the calibration of technology and the production function, firstly the depreciation
rate δ is fixed in 0.06 following Brinca et al. (2016). Relatively to the CES production function
parameters, firstly the share of capital in the capital/skilled-labor composite, φ2, is set to 0.805
and the share of the composite in the composite/non-skilled-labor equation, φ1, is set to 0.550.
These go in line with the analogous parameters used in Eden and Gaggl (2018). Then, the
elasticity of substitution (EOS) between skilled labor and capital, σ, inside the composite is set
to 0.670 and the EOS between the composite and non-skilled labor, ρ, is set to 1.670. These
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values were found to be adequate in order to allow for the process of skill-biased technological
change to be modeled. With a ρ > 1 and a σ < 1 the degree of substitutability between non-
skilled labor and capital is considerably higher that that between skilled labor and capital.
Taxes and Social Security
The tax schedule is modeled according to the aforementioned equation (15). From this equation,
the progressivity parameter θ2 is fixed in 0.160 following the method of Ferriere and Navarro
(2018). By setting the lump-sum transfer g to 0.000, the value of θ1 implied by the government
budget clearing condition was 0.940. Additionally, the consumption tax rate τc and the capital
income tax rate τk are set to 0.054 and 0.469 consecutively to match the values obtained in
Mendoza et al. (1994). For the social security taxes, both values are set to 0.061.
Endogenously Calibrated Parameters
To calibrate the parameters that do not have direct empirical counterparts, discount factors
{β1,β2}, disutility of work χ, utility of leaving bequests ϕ, variance of ability σa and variance
of idiosyncratic risk σǫ, the simulated method of moments (SMM) was used. Through it, the
following loss function was minimized:
L(β1,β2,ϕ,χ,σa,σǫ) = ||Mm−Md|| (25)
where Mm and Md are the moments in the model and in the data respectively. For the system
to be just-identified and since there are six model parameters to be calibrated endogenously, the
need for six data moments arises. These data moments that will be used as targets are described
in table 2. The parameters calibrated with these targets are presented in table 3.
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Table 2: Calibration Fit
Data Moment Description Source Data Value Model Value
a¯75−80/a¯ Mean wealth age 75-80 / Mean wealth LWS 1.51 1.51
K/Y Capital-output ratio BEA 3.00 3.00
Var(lnw) Variance of log wages CPS9 0.29 0.29
n¯ Fraction of hours worked OECD 0.33 0.33
Q90 Income share of the bottom 90% WID 0.66 0.65
Gini Gini Index WID 0.46 0.46
Table 3: Parameters Calibrated Endogenously
Parameter Value Description Data Target
Preferences
ϕ 5.850 Bequest utility a¯75−80/a¯
β1 0.978 Discount factor 1 K/Y
β2 0.100 Discount factor 2 Q90
χ 8.200 Disutility of work n¯
Labor and Wages
σa 0.355 Variance of ability Gini
σǫ 0.100 Variance of risk Var(lnw)
Besides the calibration of the benchmark economy, the model was later calibrated to match the
tax-transfer system, social security, level of debt, government expenditure and TFP of the U.S.
in 2010. All other parameters were kept constant between steady-states. For the exogenously
calibrated values of government and social security parameters, these are presented in table 6
in appendix A.
Relatively to TFP, this is the model’s representation of technological change, and a crucial
element of this paper’s analysis. The TFP was calibrated for 2010 to replicate the growth of
GDP/Capita from 1980 to 2010. Since the TFP is normalized to 1.000 in 1980, the resulting
TFP for 2010 was 1.720.10
Additionally, to substantiate the good performance of the model, some of the statistics
were verified to check whether they match the empirical data. The model predicted that from
1980 to 2010, both the income and wealth Gini increased, the wage premium for skilled workers
increased and wage dispersion increased. All these match the empirically observed data and
therefore support the model’s robustness.
5 Fiscal Experiment
The focus of this experiment is centered on the evaluation of the welfare effects deriving from
the implementation of an universal basic income system. Consequently, the design of this UBI
system ought to be clarified. In this paper, the analyzed system will be comprised of a universal
9According to Katz et al. (1999).
10The data used for GDP per capita was taken from: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National
Accounts data files.
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and unconditional lump-sum transfer which is paid for by consumption and capital taxes and
also by a flat labor tax with no progressivity. Consequently, the experiment consists of a steady-
state analysis comparing the optimal level of UBI for the years of 1980 and 2010 in the U.S.
These years were chosen grounded on the literature and also due to the fact that the gap between
them is considerably representative of the high increase in U.S.’s income inequality. Taking into
account the main purpose of this analysis, the fact that more recent years were not used is
decidedly not detrimental to results.
It is relevant to note that in both of the analyzed years, 1980 and 2010, the tax system
has no universal transfer to households, g = 0, but has some degree of progressivity, θ2 >
0. Therefore, firstly the optimal lump-sum transfer (and associated labor tax level), will be
calculated for an hypothetical UBI system in both years. This will tell whether the optimal
level of UBI changed from 1980 to 2010 in light of the process of skill-biased technological
change. Secondly, a baseline comparison will be done between the actual 1980 and 2010 tax
systems and the UBI one. This will then answer the question on whether the implementation
of UBI would entail an welfare gain in one, both or none of the years. The procedure used will
be further explained in the following subsections.
5.1 Welfare Criteria
With the purpose of comparing different lump-sum transfer levels and whether they are beneficial
or not to society, a proper welfare measure is needed. In this paper, two different ones are used.
The first one is the expected social welfare which can be expressed as follows:
SW 1t = E[V ]t =
1∫
dΦ
[∫
j<45
V (h,β,a,u,j)tdΦ+
∫
j≥45
V (h,β,j)tdΦ
]
(26)
This is the criteria which determined the results. However, for completeness and confirmation,
a second measure is also employed which was borrowed from McGrattan and Aiyagari (1997)
and can be expressed as:
SW 2t =Ω =
∫ ∫
V (h,β,a,u,j)dH(h,β,a,u,j) (27)
With regard to notation, V is the optimal value function and H is the steady-state joint distri-
bution of assets and productivity.
5.2 Optimal Evaluation
To compare the optimal level of UBI in 1980 and 2010, the evaluation procedure undergone was
the following:
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1. Computation of social welfare for the benchmark economy (U.S. 1980) with the existing
tax system.
2. Computation of the optimal lump-sum transfer with the UBI system in 1980, through an
welfare evaluation.
3. Computation of social welfare for the U.S. 2010 economy with the existing tax system.
4. Computation of the optimal lump-sum transfer with the UBI system in 2010, through an
welfare evaluation.
5.3 Causality
It is highly relevant to note that after comparing the optimal UBI levels for 1980 and 2010,
one can not immediately conclude that this difference is attributed to technological change.
As previously mentioned, the year of 2010 was calibrated to match not only the technological
development but also the tax system, social security, debt and government spending of that
year. Therefore, to avoid the identification problem that would arise from this analysis, an
intermediate step was done in the process. This involved re-calibrating 1980’s economy to
include the value of 2010’s technology parameters and then calculating the optimal UBI level.
This procedure was able to establish a causal relationship between technological change and
UBI and accordingly, the rest of the analysis followed. The full results of this procedure are
displayed in Appendix B.
6 Results and Discussion
In this section, results from the aforementioned experiment will be presented and the main
economic mechanisms explained. Firstly, the optimal evaluation procedure was conducted with
its main results being displayed in figures 3 and 4.
To begin with, the most immediate result is that, considering an UBI system implemen-
tation, the optimal lump-sum transfer level rises from g = 0 in 1980 to g = 0.125 in 2010. For
1980, what this effectively means is that the optimal is actually the nonexistence of an UBI
system. Therefore, one can say that in this year, for a system with a flat labor tax rate without
progressivity, society’s welfare would be maximized with no lump-sum transfer and a tax on
labor income of as low as 8%.11
The striking difference for 2010 is that the optimal is actually positive with society’s welfare being
maximized with a lump-sum transfer of g = 0.125 corresponding to around 8% of Y/Capita.
11Henceforth, it is relevant to take into account that all social welfare comparisons are done in % terms of a
baseline level that should be indicated (e.g. an 100.1% of a g = 0 baseline means that that point entails a 0.1%
improvement over a system with g = 0).
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Figure 3: Optimal UBI level: 1980 and 2010 Figure 4: Optimal UBI level: 1980 + Tech. and 2010
This, in turn, leads to an optimal government budget clearing labor tax of 28.5%. The welfare
gain from this optimal over a g = 0 is of 0.163%12
Table 4: 2010 Optimal Evaluation Results
Optimal
g 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.125 0.14 0.16 0.20
1− θ1
13 13.0 17.0 22.0 27.7 28.5 30.6 33.7 40.4
Y/Capita 1.66 1.64 1.60 1.57 1.56 1.54 1.52 1.47
g%(Y/Capita) 0.0 2.4 5.0 7.7 8.0 9.1 10.5 13.6
By analyzing the results presented in table 4, one can infer on the economic intuition behind
this optimal solution. As stated in section 4, the differences between the 1980 and 2010 steady-
states are the government and tax system, and technological level measured through the TFP
and SBTC. Even though all these parameter changes affected optimality, through the curves
presented on figure 4, one can conclude that it is the technological change driving most of this
result. The technology change, in this case, winds up being factor-augmenting since it generates
a positive shock to the permanent component of skilled worker’s productivity. Through market
clearing conditions, this will, in turn, permanently increase their average earnings over non-
skilled workers which explains the observable skill premium rise from 1980 to 2010. Accordingly,
this skill premium rise increases wage dispersion and income inequality. By taking into account
the concave profile of agent’s utility, it becomes clear how an additional unit of consumption
benefits the poor more than the rich and therefore, for an utilitarian social planner, having an
economy with high inequality ends up being detrimental to social welfare.
In this type of context, it is straightforward to understand why in an UBI system, the
optimal lump-sum transfer level is actually positive and equal to 8% of GDP per capita. Since
the productivity shock from technological growth is permanent, the social planner has an higher
12Full results of the welfare evaluation procedure are displayed in Appendix C.
13Taking into consideration the modelled tax schedule, 1− θ1 corresponds to the flat tax rate on labor income.
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motive for the application of redistribution. Taking this into account, from g = 0 until g = 0.125,
the gains from redistribution are large and social welfare improves. However, from that point
onwards, the fact that the labor tax level starts rising above the 30% mark, generates an intense
distortion of agent’s choices and discouragement of work which ends up being detrimental to
welfare. Since the most productive agents are the ones paying an higher labor tax net of transfer,
these are the most discouraged and as a consequence, the economy will tend do produce less
and Y/Capita will decrease, as seen in table 4. This clearly shows the trade-off between social
equity and efficiency since higher redistribution comes associated with lower output.
With regard to the result observed in figure 4, one can see that while the optimal level
of the UBI system for 2010 is comprised of a g = 0.125, the one for an economy with 2010’s
technology inputted into 1980’s characteristics, consists of a g = 0.150 corresponding to 9.55%
of GDP per capita. The main takeaway from here is that 2010’s social security, capital and
consumption taxes, debt and government spending, decrease, in some away, the necessity for an
high lump-sum transfer.
Table 5: Government parameters in the optimal: 2010 and 1980 + ∆Technology
g 1− θ1 τc τk B/Y Y/Capita g%(Y/Capita)
1980 + ∆Technology 0.150 20.4 0.054 0.469 0.320 1.57 9.55
2010 0.125 28.5 0.050 0.360 0.879 1.56 8.00
By looking at table 5, it is possible to construct an explanatory hypothesis for this result. In
1980, both consumption and capital income taxes are higher than in 2010 while the debt is
lower. As in the model, the tax level 1− θ1 is responsible for the clearing of the government
budget constraint, with 1980’s more balanced government budget, even if g is rather high, the
level of labor tax needed to pay for it will be fairly lower. Thus, it may be optimal for this
economy to have an higher lump-sum transfer than in the 2010 case since the associated labor
tax level is not as high, which means that it is feasible to attain an higher level of UBI without
as much distortion in terms of labor choices.
6.1 UBI vs. Actual Tax System
It is imperative to reinforce that the optimal evaluations of the preceding section were merely
focused in computing the optimal level of the lump-sum transfer for an UBI system with no
progressivity on labor taxation. Even though this facilitated the comparison of these optimal
values, the actual tax systems of 1980 and 2010 have some degree of progressivity to them. As
a consequence, the question of whether the implementation of UBI would result in an welfare
improvement over the actual systems still remains unanswered. This subject will be approached
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in this part of the paper.
Figure 5 presents the social welfare comparisons between 1980’s tax system (the baseline)
and an UBI system with different levels of lump-sum transfers. Figure 6 presents the social
welfare comparisons between 2010’s tax system (the baseline) and an UBI system with different
levels of lump-sum transfers.14
Figure 5: UBI vs. Actual Tax System (1980) Figure 6: UBI vs. Actual Tax System (2010)
From these results, one can conclude that according to the model used, an UBI system would
improve societal welfare both in 1980 and 2010.
For 1980, as concluded above, the optimal would be to have neither a progressive labor
tax nor UBI. However, if the UBI lump-sum does not surpass the level of g = 0.078 or 7.62% of
GDP/Capita with an associated labor tax of 33%, society in 1980 would still be better off with
an UBI system than with the existing system at the time.
More importantly, for 2010, even though the optimal is the aforementioned lump-sum of
g = 0.125 corresponding to 8% of GDP/Capita, society would be better off with anywhere in
the interval of g ∈ [0.050;0.188] corresponding to g(%) ∈ [3.07%;12.85%] of GDP/Capita and
with associated labor tax levels of 1− θ1 ∈ [18.5%;38.7%], in comparison to the existing system
at the time.
6.2 Application to reality
This section will analyze the results found by translating them to a real-world application. The
main result gathered from the above-mentioned experiment is that an UBI implementation with
the right level of labor tax and lump-sum transfer would be optimal as a way of mitigating
negative social welfare effects from skill-biased technological change. This optimal, for 2010,
would consist of a lump-sum corresponding to 8% of GDP/Capita with an associated labor tax
level of 28.5%. Applied to the U.S. economy of 2010, this would mean an annual transfer of
14Note that in these figures, the grey lines just represent the baseline level of welfare with that year’s actual
tax system, they do not depend on the lump-sum displayed in the x-axis. The areas where the black line is above
the grey line represent UBI levels that would entail an welfare improvement over the actual systems. Vice-versa
for areas where the black line is below.
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around 3,877$ per person. The tax schedule in figure 7 depicts this system.
Figure 7: Tax schedule with the optimal UBI system
Looking at the represented schedule, one can see the labor tax level of the optimal, 1−θ1 =
0.285 and then the actual shape of the tax rate net of the lump-sum transfer. What can be
concluded is that this UBI system with a flat labor tax rate and fixed universal lump-sum
transfer, ends up creating a tax schedule similar to one of a system with a progressive labor tax.
The main difference is that in this case, the tax rate can reach negative values, which happens
when the tax rate paid on labor is inferior to the aforementioned transfer of 3,877$.15 This is
very identical to a negative income tax schedule, except for the fact that in the UBI fiscal system
everyone pays the same tax in percentage, and everyone receives the same transfer in absolute
terms.16
It is worth of notice that the value of 3,877$ for the lump-sum transfer appears to be
rather small. For contextualization, U.S.’s median household income in 2010 was 49,445$ and
presidential candidate Andrew Yang’s “Freedom Dividend” proposal consists of a transfer of
1,000$ per month. This indicates that this paper’s value would, most likely, be rather smaller
than the amount needed to attain the main objectives of universal basic income. The reasoning
behind this might be that the model should be expanded for a more complete analysis of these
mechanisms. One relevant aspect regards the fact that UBI is generally discussed within the
context of unemployment, something which is not modelled here. Nevertheless, this does not,
in any way, invalidate the main results that were found, mainly the relationship between an
optimal positive lump-sum transfer and the process of skill-biased technological change. The
following section will summarize these results while concluding the research.
15This would be the case of workers earning an income below 13,603$.
16Some author’s argue that in psychological terms this is beneficial since it reduces the stigma of social support
from the state. Since everyone pays and everyone receives, the ones benefiting more would not feel as wrongly in
doing so.
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7 Conclusion
This research intended to analyze whether a universal basic income system could improve social
welfare in the context of skill-biased technological change and additionally, evaluate the optimal
level of this UBI system. With this purpose, a life-cycle model was calibrated to resemble the
economy of the U.S. in 1980 and 2010 and within this framework, two major results were found.
Firstly, it was found that a UBI system comprised of a flat tax rate on labor and a lump-
sum transfer could have improved social welfare in 2010 in relation to the existing tax-transfer
system at the time. In addition, the optimal level would actually consist of a lump-sum transfer
of 8% of GDP per capita paid for by a flat labor tax rate of 28.5%. Even though there are
disparities between 2010 and today’s economy, it can be logically hypothesized that today’s
optimal transfer would not differ exceedingly and if so, it would most likely be fairly higher.17
Secondly, it was also established that the above-mentioned result is primarily motivated
by the process of skill-biased technological change. This was concluded through an analysis
of technological progress alone, which predicted an optimal UBI transfer consisting of an even
higher value of 9.55% of GDP per capita. This result is of great relevance as it establishes a
strong positive relationship between SBTC and universal basic income which can be further
examined in future work.
The mechanism found to be driving these results was mainly the factor-augmenting tech-
nological growth. This process occurs when technological progress ends up widening the gap
between skilled and non-skilled workers’ productivity. This, in turn, also widens the gap between
their wages, elevating the skill premium and consequently, income inequality.
In light of these results, there are some thoughts worth of discussion. First of all, as referred
earlier, redistributive policies in general, with UBI being no exception, highlight the trade-off
between efficiency and equity. When applying this paper’s results to reality, the optimal policy
might change considerably. This is due to the fact that the weight the social planner attributes
to equity or efficiency varies a great deal, depending on many other socioeconomic factors not
reviewed in this paper. Additionally, one might ask whether another redistributive system such
as increased tax progressivity or a negative income tax would entail an even higher welfare gain
than UBI. Even though that type of comparison was not as deeply approached in this article,
it is in fact a compelling point for future research. To end up with, as UBI is deeply discussed
in association with social support for the unemployed, an extension of this model to relax the
full-employment assumption would also be of great interest for posterior work.
17The basis for this statement is that income Gini has increased even more since 2010, giving strength to the
argument in favor of redistribution.
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Appendices
A Parameter Shifts
Table 6: Government and SS calibration 1980 - 2010
Description Parameter 1980 2010 Source
Consumption tax rate τc 0.054 0.050 Mendoza et al. (1994)
Capital income tax rate τk 0.469 0.360 Mendoza et al. (1994)
Tax scale parameter θ1 0.940 0.895 Implied by clearing condition
Tax progressivity parameter θ2 0.160 0.095 Ferriere and Navarro (2018)
Government debt to GDP B/Y 0.320 0.879 FRED
Military spending to GDP G/Y 0.053 0.045 World Bank
SS tax employees τss 0.061 0.077 Social Security Bulletin, July 1981
SS tax employers τ˜ss 0.061 0.077 Social Security Bulletin
B Causality Inference
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Table 7: Welfare evaluation for 1980’s characteristics with 2010’s technology
g 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
E[W ] 1.00000 1.00026 1.00046 1.00065 1.00085 1.00104
g 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11
E[W ] 1.00121 1.00136 1.00150 1.00162 1.00173 1.00182
Optimal
g 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17
E[W ] 1.00189 1.00195 1.00197 1.00199 1.00197 1.00193
g 0.18 0.19 0.20
E[W ] 1.00186 1.00175 1.00161
Table 8: Welfare evaluation for 1980
Optimal
g 0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
E[W ] 1.00000 0.99988 0.99975 0.99941 0.99904 0.99849
g 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11
E[W ] 0.99785 0.99683 0.99569 0.9943 0.99235 0.99003
Figure 8: Welfare evaluation for causality experiment
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C Detailed Welfare Evaluation Results
Table 9: Welfare evaluation for 1980 with UBI
1980 (UBI system)
g 0.000 0.010 0.020 0.030 0.040 0.050 0.060 0.070 0.080 0.090 0.100
E[W] 1.00000 0.99988 0.99975 0.99941 0.99904 0.99849 0.99785 0.99683 0.99569 0.99430 0.99235
Tabor Tax 0.080 0.115 0.135 0.170 0.198 0.230 0.260 0.300 0.337 0.375 0.420
Y/Capita 1.020 1.007 1.000 0.987 0.976 0.963 0.950 0.933 0.915 0.896 0.872
g % (Y/Capita) 0.000 0.010 0.020 0.030 0.041 0.052 0.063 0.075 0.087 0.100 0.115
Table 10: Welfare evaluation for 1980 with 2010 technology and an UBI system
1980 with technological change (UBI system)
g 0.000 0.010 0.020 0.030 0.040 0.050 0.060 0.070 0.080 0.090 0.100
E[W] 1.00000 1.00026 1.00046 1.00065 1.00085 1.00104 1.00121 1.00136 1.00150 1.00162 1.00173
Tabor Tax 0.030 0.045 0.054 0.064 0.075 0.086 0.097 0.108 0.119 0.130 0.142
Y/Capita 1.681 1.672 1.667 1.661 1.655 1.648 1.642 1.635 1.628 1.622 1.614
g % (Y/Capita) 0.000 0.006 0.012 0.018 0.024 0.030 0.037 0.043 0.049 0.055 0.062
g 0.110 0.120 0.130 0.140 0.150 0.160 0.170 0.180 0.190 0.200
E[W] 1.00182 1.00189 1.00195 1.00197 1.00199 1.00197 1.00193 1.00186 1.00175 1.00161
Tabor Tax 0.154 0.165 0.179 0.191 0.204 0.217 0.231 0.245 0.260 0.275
Y/Capita 1.607 1.600 1.591 1.583 1.574 1.566 1.556 1.547 1.536 1.525
g % (Y/Capita) 0.068 0.075 0.082 0.088 0.095 0.102 0.109 0.116 0.124 0.131
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Table 11: Welfare evaluation for 2010 with UBI
2010 (UBI system)
g 0.000 0.010 0.020 0.030 0.040 0.050 0.060 0.070 0.080 0.090 0.100
E[W] 1.00000 1.00010 1.00035 1.00056 1.00072 1.00093 1.00106 1.00121 1.00134 1.00143 1.00151
Tabor Tax 0.130 0.135 0.148 0.160 0.172 0.185 0.195 0.208 0.220 0.234 0.247
Y/Capita 1.661 1.658 1.650 1.643 1.636 1.627 1.620 1.612 1.603 1.595 1.586
g % (Y/Capita) 0.000 0.006 0.012 0.018 0.024 0.031 0.037 0.043 0.050 0.056 0.063
g 0.110 0.120 0.130 0.140 0.150 0.160 0.170 0.180 0.190 0.200
E[W] 1.00157 1.00160 1.00160 1.00156 1.00150 1.00140 1.00126 1.00107 1.00083 1.00054
Tabor Tax 0.262 0.277 0.293 0.306 0.322 0.337 0.353 0.370 0.387 0.404
Y/Capita 1.576 1.565 1.554 1.543 1.532 1.521 1.508 1.495 1.481 1.466
g % (Y/Capita) 0.070 0.077 0.084 0.091 0.098 0.105 0.113 0.120 0.128 0.136
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D UK ONS’s Table Excerpt
Table 12: UK ONS’s probability of automation by professional group for the UK in 2017
Lower Probability Higher Probability
Medical practitioners 0.181 Industrial cleaning process occupations 0.640
Higher ed. teaching professionals 0.203 Fork-lift truck drivers 0.644
Senior professionals of ed. establishments 0.206 Textile process operatives 0.646
Secondary ed. teaching professionals 0.206 Food, drink and tobacco process operatives 0.650
Dental practitioners 0.208 Other elementary services occupations n.e.c. 0.653
Psychologists 0.209 Elementary agriculture occupations n.e.c. 0.654
Medical radiographers 0.210 Retail cashiers and check-out operators 0.655
Physiotherapists 0.212 Van drivers 0.655
Occupational therapists 0.215 Elementary administration occupations n.e.c. 0.657
Primary and nursery ed. teaching professionals 0.220 Agricultural machinery drivers 0.658
Clergy 0.221 Launderers, dry cleaners and pressers 0.662
Physical scientists 0.221 Leisure and theme park attendants 0.665
Natural and social science professionals n.e.c. 0.221 Weighers, graders and sorters 0.672
Research and development managers 0.222 Packers, bottlers, canners and fillers 0.672
Speech and language therapists 0.222 Vehicle valeters and cleaners 0.678
Architects 0.225 Tyre, exhaust and windscreen fitters 0.681
Education advisers and school inspectors 0.225 Cleaners and domestics 0.681
Solicitors 0.226 Sewing machinists 0.686
Biological scientists and biochemists 0.228 Farm workers 0.690
Town planning officers 0.229 Kitchen and catering assistants 0.692
Senior police officers 0.230 Bar staff 0.707
Officers in armed forces 0.230 Elementary sales occupations n.e.c. 0.707
Further education teaching professionals 0.231 Shelf fillers 0.717
Actuaries, economists and statisticians 0.232 Waiters and waitresses 0.728
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